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Lasting constitutional change—if there is such a thing in the UK—is difficult to
achieve. Developments such as affiliating to the European Communities, passing the
HRA, and implementing devolution were successfully brought about because debate
over such proposals had ensued for decades, and there appeared to be political and
judicial consensus that at least some type of change in these areas was needed.
In a seemingly impromptu attempt to enact some type of lasting constitutional
change, the Conservatives have championed changes to their ‘Charter for Budget
Responsibility’ (as established by the Budget Responsibility and National Audit
Act 2011), which now stipulates that no government can spend more than it brings
in from revenues ‘in normal times’. In what constituted an embarrassing episode
for Jeremy Corbyn’s New Labour, the House of Commons approved the changes,
with 21 Labour members defying the Whip. But while political bantering around U-
turns are apt for newspaper headlines and tweets, the Charter points to far more
significant implications. Many see it as an economic ‘mistake’ or even impossible.
While the size of the welfare state and the balancing of budgets are long debated
issues, the implementation of a mandatory fiscal surplus in just a few years’ time
does not appear to be the wisest way to go about reaching any type of consensus on
the matter.
Before expanding on the constitutional implications, let’s look at the document more
closely. A key aspect of the charter is the phrasing that it only applies in ‘normal
times’ (Section 3.2), and it does not take a savvy judge to determine that this clause
could be interpreted widely. Even if this is supposed to mean nothing more than
‘when the economy is growing’, it raises more doubts than it settles. Could ‘normal
times’ also apply during times of war (probably not, but what about a perpetual war:
e.g., ‘the war on terror’), during a pandemic (or frights from diseases, e.g. Ebola,
H1N1, etc.), or during times of increasing or high crime (or during a moral panic over
certain types of crime)? The possibilities are endless for this vaguely worded clause,
which lessons its definition and purpose and, therefore, its enforcement scope.
A significant misconception has also arisen around the charter. Various media
reports have noted that the charter is ‘legally-binding’ and can ‘legally force’
future governments to abide by its terms. On the day it passed, George Osborne
himself talked about ‘lock[ing] it in’ and ‘committing us to running a surplus’. On
closer inspection there appears to be little grounds on which the charter could be
considered legally binding. Barring the vagueness of the ‘normal times’ language,
the charter was passed by a resolution of the House of Commons. These resolutions
– unlike budget resolutions – are not immediately legally binding. The primary
body overseeing enforcement of the Charter is the Office for Budget Responsibility
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(‘OBR’), which is responsible for holding the Government accountable for the
targets set. However this body does not possess coercive statutory powers,
but merely advises the Treasury. Hence the Charter is ultimately self-enforced
by the Government of the day (by the Treasury, via the OBR). It is an internal
fiscal policy, not mandatory law. But, what happens when the end of the current
Parliament arrives and a budget deficit still looms? In order to stay ‘true to their
word’ (something especially important in an election year) the Government may start
slashing programs even quicker than before. Many of these cuts, eventually, could
be challenged in the courts. For example, the legal aid cuts were challenged, but
upheld by a high court in February. The court ruled that the cuts were proportionate
for legal aid to be provided at reduced fees. But, what would some of the rationales
be if cuts came about because of the fiscal Charter? Could the courts uphold budget
cuts simply because the government was running a deficit; or because the ‘will’
or ‘sentiments’ of Parliament (through the resolution) expressed a desire to have
a more balanced budget? Although this seems highly unlikely, it is not out of the
question.
While the Charter may not be the legally binding instrument the media and others
have made it out to be, it still could yield significant constitutional implications.
Customs and conventions in the UK constitution are rampant, and through the
fiscal Charter the Conservatives’ intention is that of committing the current and
future Governments into running a permanent budget surplus. In our view this is
a sinister attempt to bind future governments as regards fiscal policy (additionally,
we also believe that it violates some significant political elements of parliamentary
sovereignty in relation to how the power of the Queen-in-Parliament is being
constricted, although that will not be explored further in this piece). Nevertheless,
embedding a particular economic approach to fiscal policy via the Charter politically
pre-empts future governments’ initiatives vis-à-vis their own fiscal policies, making
it look as if they will be departing from a ‘standard’—for which they will have to seek
the House of Commons’ approval—rather than legitimately setting their own fiscal
objectives and policies (as has previously been the case). Although the Charter
might not be legally binding, it certainly infringes on the right of initiative for new
governments planning to employ alternative economic doctrines, by making it more
constitutionally conspicuous to do so. Further, the Charter may indeed be a prelude
to something more lasting (perhaps even something of statutory value), the prospect
of which makes its presence even more unwelcome.
Oscar Wilde once proclaimed that ‘consistency is the last refuge of the
unimaginative’. There was a time in the very recent past when Conservatives valued
the sovereignty of elected governments to set their own fiscal policy. In fact this
very issue arose in late 2011/early 2012 when the Coalition Government had the
opportunity to sign the EU Fiscal Compact, which mandates that a ‘balanced budget
rule’ be incorporated into member state legal systems. At the time twenty-five of the
current twenty-seven member countries signed the treaty (subsequently the Czech
Republic, one of the two lone holdouts, has made moves towards implementing it).
Yet Mr Cameron employed a rarely used veto in December 2011 to block changes
that would have implemented the treaty, setting off a firestorm of debate, and which
led to Britain’s refusal to sign the treaty in March 2012. Now, however, Mr Cameron’s
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current Government appears to be basking in the advice of Mr Wilde, given they
are, ironically, attempting to bind future governments to such a mandate through the
Fiscal Charter. Ultimately, such inconsistencies further muddle the significance of the
Charter, exposing it as a wanting—and not legally or politically binding—attempt at
constitutional change.
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